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Motivating provision of high quality care: it is not 
all about the money
Mylène Lagarde, Luis Huicho, and Irene Papanicolas discuss different strategies policy makers 
can use to motivate health providers in order to improve quality of care
The inclusion of universal health cover-
age as a target in the sustainable develop-
ment goal for health has boosted the global 
movement to improve access to healthcare 
services. To improve health, the services 
accessed must be high quality,1 yet there is 
mounting evidence that the quality of care 
delivered to populations in many low and 
middle income countries is inadequate.2-5 
Governments must consider strategies that 
will not only improve accessibility to care 
for their populations but also substantially 
improve quality.
A priority in achieving universal health 
coverage is the recruitment, training, and 
retention of healthcare workers. However, 
there is widespread concern that health 
systems are not getting the most out of their 
workforce. Recent evidence shows that the 
quality of care provided by healthcare 
workers is often lower than what they 
are able to demonstrate in the context of 
a test2 or under the watchful eyes of an 
observer.6 The existence of such “know-do” 
gaps shows that substandard care cannot 
be fully explained by low competence or 
inadequate training. 
Low quality of care and medical errors 
occur more often when providers are demo-
tivated, which can be fuelled by inadequate 
working conditions such as shortages of 
basic drugs and equipment or staff.7-9 Yet, 
although good working conditions are an 
important part of delivering good quality of 
care, they are not sufficient to ensure that 
health professionals are motivated and 
adhere to recommended treatment guide-
lines.10 11 Here, we discuss the evidence 
on different approaches that can be used 
to increase provider motivation and ulti-
mately improve quality of care.
Financial incentives are not always worth the 
investment
Economists, managers, and policy makers 
have long seen remuneration as an obvi-
ous lever to influence providers’ behaviour. 
In high income settings, the use of direct 
financial incentives to improve quality has 
been ubiquitous with the aim of maintain-
ing high quality standards while encour-
aging more efficient spending. In settings 
where salaries are low and health workers 
demotivated,7 similar pay-for-performance 
schemes have been used, often to achieve 
a dual objective: to increase remuneration 
and to provide incentives for improving 
performance.
Despite the enthusiasm for these 
schemes, the evidence of their impact on 
quality of care is lacklustre. Although they 
have been found to increase adherence 
to quality of care processes, their overall 
effects are mixed and, when positive, 
small.12-14 For example, an experiment in 
Rwanda led to the improvement of some 
rewarded measures of process of care (eg, 
iron supplementation for children, urine 
analysis in antenatal care), but not of 
others (eg, malaria prophylaxis and tetanus 
vaccination for pregnant women),15 16 and 
provider effort in antenatal consultations 
was only slightly higher than in the 
absence of incentives.17 This is one of 
several examples of the mixed results 
achieved by pay-for-performance schemes 
in terms of quality improvement in low 
income settings, which are disappointing 
considering the investment made.18
The global evidence is similarly 
mixed, with no evidence of significant 
improvement in health outcomes after 
the introduction of pay-for-performance 
schemes.13 Furthermore, caution is needed 
to avoid unintended consequences that 
can be costly or compromise quality. For 
example, when income is directly linked 
to drug sales, more unnecessary drugs are 
likely to be prescribed19; when providers 
are reimbursed differently for inputs with 
similar health benefits they may choose 
the more profitable ones at the expense 
of efficiency.20 More generally, questions 
remain about the cost effectiveness of 
using financial incentives, especially when 
budgets are tight.21
The multiple ways in which financial 
incentives can be designed, as well as the 
complexity of the healthcare environment 
in which they are introduced,22 may help 
explain why results have not always been 
as expected.23 Incentive schemes can 
differ in terms of the number and types of 
performance indicators targeted, the size of 
the reward in relation to provider’s income, 
or the extent to which the performance 
targets are completely under a provider’s 
control. All of these design choices 
matter and influence the effect of the 
incentives.24 The incentive will also be more 
powerful if it directly targets individual 
providers (specialists) rather than small 
teams (primary care centres) or large 
organisations (hospitals). If individuals 
value losses more than gains, penalties for 
failing to achieve targets will work better 
than rewards for doing so.25
Lastly, providers’ personal characteristics 
may affect how they respond to incentives. 
For instance, a recent study found that 
certain personality traits may predispose 
some people to respond more to incentives 
than others.26 For people driven by factors 
other than remuneration, financial 
incentives may backfire.27 This may be 
particularly relevant to the healthcare 
sector, as workers are likely to care about 
not only their income but also their 
reputation, their patients, or their job.
Reputation matters in some contexts
Another way to incentivise quality improve-
ment is to publish providers’ perfor-
mance to the public or to their peers. This 
approach harnesses the power of another 
source of extrinsic motivation, concerns 
for your reputation, which are expected to 
push individuals to perform better.25 28
Many countries have made measures of 
hospital performance publicly available, 
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typically reporting on waiting times or 
patient experience, and sometimes on 
measures of quality and safety, such as 
mortality and complications. Most evidence 
on the impact of public reporting comes 
from the US and shows mixed results.29 
For hospitals, public reporting has been 
linked to small increases in adherence to 
processes of care30 but not to reductions 
in mortality.31 32 For individual health 
professionals, it has been associated with 
decreases in mortality,33 34 but there are 
concerns about how these reductions are 
achieved, and in particular the extent to 
which public reporting encourages patient 
selection.35 36
In settings where administrative 
information on provider quality is lacking 
or less credible, public reporting of provider 
performance can rely on community 
based monitoring of service delivery and 
engagement with providers.37 Robust 
evidence on such initiatives is still limited, 
but in a pioneering experiment in Uganda, 
when non-governmental organisations 
distributed reports on use and quality of 
services to local communities, mortality in 
children under 5 years old fell by a third.38
Public reporting programmes could 
therefore be a worthwhile strategy to 
promote quality, but their effectiveness 
requires careful design and a favourable 
environment.22 The information reported 
has to be credible and salient. To achieve 
this, it has to come from a trustworthy 
source; depending on the setting this 
may or may not be the government.39 
Equally, the information reported has to be 
noticeable and focused on a few indicators, 
to avoid being ignored.40
Public reporting will improve quality 
only if providers are held accountable for 
their performance in some way. Even in the 
absence of potential reputational or legal 
consequences, publicly reporting poor 
practice can have financial consequences 
in a competitive healthcare market. If 
providers’ income is linked to the volume 
of patients, low performers will be 
automatically penalised as patients will 
“vote with their feet” and choose higher 
quality providers. But to achieve this, 
patients must be able to both access and 
use the information reported. In many 
settings, this may require additional 
supporting initiatives to help patients 
navigate a complex environment, or simply 
use and interpret the data. Conversely, 
if poor practice does not lead to negative 
consequences for providers—whether 
financial, moral or legal—public reporting 
will be a toothless policy.
Harnessing the power of intrinsic motivation
Intrinsic motivation is known to be a pow-
erful driver of provider behaviours.41-44 Two 
different sources of motivation are identi-
fied: the satisfaction derived from under-
taking actions that benefit other people or 
society (sometimes referred to as altruistic 
or prosocial motivation) and the interest or 
enjoyment of a task itself.
Evidence is emerging that intrinsically 
motivated providers display desirable 
behaviours or attitudes towards patients. 
Health education research in high income 
countries shows the importance and long 
term benefits of selecting people with 
altruistic values, such as compassion or 
empathy, into the medical profession.45 
Research in sub-Saharan Africa has 
found that nurses who are more generous 
towards patients are more likely to choose 
jobs in rural and remote areas,46 and that 
more generous clinicians provide better 
quality of care to patients.47 Yet, few 
interventions have rigorously explored the 
extent to which intrinsic motivation can be 
shaped or harnessed to motivate quality 
improvement.
Policy interventions that could appeal 
to this type of motivation fall into two 
categories, depending on whether intrinsic 
motivation is seen to be malleable or not. If 
intrinsic motivation is an innate individual 
trait, policy makers should try to select 
more people who display the right type of 
motivation. On the other hand, if intrinsic 
motivation is a form of capital that can 
be depreciated or accrued,48 specific 
interventions should be introduced to 
nurture it. We consider recent examples of 
both approaches.
Selecting people with intrinsic motivation
Many countries have introduced pro-
grammes to select people into medical or 
nursing training by introducing quotas 
based on people’s geographical origin in 
order to increase the rural retention of staff, 
especially in low income settings,49 50 but 
selection of medical students is still mostly 
based on academic attainment. There are 
concerns that this approach is not sufficient 
to ensure that people with softer skills are 
selected.51 A few countries have started to 
introduce selection procedures to identify 
medical workers with personality traits and 
values indicative of intrinsic and altruis-
tic motivation.52 However, such initiatives 
are still in their infancy, and controversy 
remains about the types of non-academic 
attributes that should be included and the 
validity of the selection procedures. More 
research needs to be carried out to determine 
which attributes are associated with better 
patient care for specific types of healthcare 
workers to inform such initiatives. 
Selecting the “right” attributes is also 
critical when recruiting people for specific 
jobs. As economic theory suggests that 
people sort into jobs matching their 
preferences or motivation,53 54 employers 
could attract the “right” people by 
emphasising certain job characteristics. A 
non-governmental organisation recently 
tested this idea in Uganda, exploring 
whether highlighting particular aspects 
of the role of community health workers 
would make the job appeal to more 
altruistic people.55 Information about job 
remuneration was manipulated to suggest to 
applicants that the main role was either more 
commercial (selling small products such as 
salt or soap to households) or more prosocial 
(providing health advice). When lower 
remuneration was advertised, potential 
applicants inferred the social aspect of the 
job was more important; those who applied 
showed higher levels of altruism and ended 
up staying longer on the job and visited 
households more frequently.55 Similar 
success with framing job adverts has been 
found in other sectors,56 57 and it deserves 
further exploration.
Nurturing intrinsic motivation through 
feedback
Few policies have sought to specifically 
influence or nurture the motivational 
capital of providers. Examples include 
encouraging quality improvement through 
educational outreach programmes or audit 
and feedback, either to promote the defini-
tion of shared quality norms among groups 
of providers, or to highlight the benefits of 
good quality for patients.
An example of such interventions 
are physician collaboratives, which 
have some positive effects on quality of 
care.58 This approach uses confidential 
performance feedback to individuals and 
then creates opportunities to share lessons 
in a multidisciplinary setting and agree 
on high quality standards and practices. 
The Swedish quality registers are often 
highlighted as an example that has had 
a sustained and large effect on quality.59 
Crucial to their success seems to be the 
fact that they are not part of an external 
regulatory or performance management 
process, but that they are driven by 
physicians themselves, who have promoted 
a culture of constructive appraisal and 
commitment to quality.59
Whereas physician collaboratives 
highlight the importance of professional 
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norms and expectations to foster intrinsic 
motivation, two other examples show how 
provider performance can be enhanced 
by nurturing the altruistic motivation 
of providers. The first comes from the 
US, where healthcare professionals in a 
hospital were more likely to change their 
behaviour and adopt better practices when 
a campaign for hand washing highlighted 
the benefits for patients rather than the 
benefit to themselves.60 The second comes 
from a low income setting, where altruistic 
motivation might be expected to have 
limited effects given the low remuneration 
and challenging working conditions. Yet, 
in a recent experiment in India, community 
health workers who received regular 
information highlighting the benefits they 
were creating for patients increased their 
performance by 25%, and this effect was 
strongest for those with high levels of 
intrinsic and altruistic motivation.61 These 
examples highlight the need to identify 
policies that can preserve and nurture such 
reservoirs of goodwill.
Improving provider motivation
Not everyone is motivated in the same 
way,62 and the interventions that we have 
described should not be seen as mutu-
ally exclusive. Instead they form a palette 
of options from which policy makers can 
choose to design the most relevant solu-
tion. This process should start with a needs 
assessment to identify and understand the 
local obstacles that limit performance and 
undermine quality of care. In some set-
tings, preliminary problems might have 
to be addressed before tackling low moti-
vation. For example, if staff do not have 
the clinical skills to make a correct diag-
nosis, no amount of money or feedback 
will increase technical quality of care. If 
essential basic drugs and equipment are 
not available, incentives will not improve 
the treatments provided to patients. 
In other contexts, careful consideration 
should be given to the broader environment 
in which health workers operate to 
understand their behaviour. Maslow’s 
seminal motivation theory63 states that 
people seek to satisfy their most pressing 
physiological and safety needs before they 
can be influenced by “growth” needs such 
as reputational concerns or altruism. In 
other words, if their financial remuneration 
is insufficient for them to make ends meet, 
providers are likely to be predominantly 
driven by financial motives. However, 
satisfaction of needs is not an “all or 
nothing” phenomenon.64 Similarly, we 
have reinforced the importance of bearing 
in mind that health professionals are 
heterogeneous in their preferences and the 
relative weight they place on these sources 
of motivation.
W h e n  d e s i g n i n g  m o t iv a t i o n a l 
instruments, policy makers also need to 
take into account the broader environment. 
Incentives usually target one aspect of 
behaviour, but they are introduced into 
a complex system with an existing set of 
cultures and constraints that may affect 
the willingness and ability of practitioners 
to respond as intended. This makes it 
difficult to predict the outcome of any 
intervention, or to generalise about 
the transferability of findings across 
systems. For example, in settings where 
governance is weak, or political will 
limited, incentives to improve provider 
performance have failed. Several studies 
have described incentive programmes 
that failed to reduce absenteeism because 
of officials’ reluctance to fully implement 
the monitoring or incentive systems,65 66 
or politicians interfering with bureaucrat 
sanctions.67 This does not mean that 
incentives cannot work in some settings but 
that they require innovative solutions, such 
as finding trusted entities to hold providers 
accountable, such as peers or the broader 
community.
Technology could also provide new 
opportunities to address these challenges. 
Mobile technologies provide cheap and 
flexible solutions to improve information 
systems and feedback, support clinical 
decisions, facilitate and monitor delivery 
of care in remote settings, and eliminate 
many barriers to payment.68-70 Despite 
the enthusiasm around and potential of 
these tools, there have been few credible 
attempts at evaluating their capabilities to 
support and increase provider motivation.61
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